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The present study is centered primarily on determining whether the German banking 
system is to be characterized by procyclical behavior from 2000 to 2011 and to what 
extent specific sectors of the German banking system showed significant balance sheet 
operations to increase their leverage within years of booming asset prices. First, the 
results of this study show that the different sectors of the German banking system 
operate their business more or less procyclically. Second, the study provides some 
empirical evidence that banks increasing their leverages during periods of extraordinary 
high returns provided in the financial markets preferred funding their assets by short-
term lending in the interbank market. Third, the study clarified that banks, preferring 
high leverages, can apparently be characterized by a high volatility of return on assets 
and low distances to default over the observation period. Finally, the examined 
regression models provide some empirical evidence that requirements on 
countercyclical capital buffers should be considered by regulatory authorities in the 
context of macroeconomic indicators. 
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Introduction 
The focus of this paper is centered primarily on the dependence between liquidity and 
leverage, as examined, for example, by Adrian and Shin (2010), who study the quarterly 
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balance sheets of five large investment banks from 1991 to 2008 in order to emphasize 
the positive relationship between changes in leverage and balance sheet size. Within this 
context the leverage is defined as the ratio of the sum of assets to the amount of capital 
on the liability side of the bank´s balance sheet. Because the balance sheets of banks are 
continuously marked-to-market the leverage is by definition continuously changing as 
well. Adrian and Shin (2010) distinguish between passive banks and banks, which 
actively adjust their balance sheet size subsequently when the leverage tends to be low. 
Such active banks are commonly operating their balance sheets in a way that their 
leverage is high during episodes of global asset market booms providing extraordinarily 
high returns, and vice versa: This means, that actively leveraging by banks results in 
procyclicality. Furthermore, Adrian and Shin (2010) demonstrate that an adjustment of 
balance sheet size is mostly done by collateralized borrowing and lending in the 
interbank market. With respect to banks` behavior during periods of actively leveraging 
it appears that banks take more debt with short-term maturities on the liability side of 
the balance sheet and look for potential returns by lending this money to borrowers, 
who are willing to pay above-average interest rates, as seen during the financial crisis in 
2008 in the event of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Moreover, rising leverages 
within the financial system are closely linked to the overall Value-at-Risk (VaR) of 
banks, which is one of the major risk measures concerning banks` assets (Adrian and 
Shin [2010]).
3 As Rajan (2006) suggests this procyclical behavior of banks should be 
discussed within the context of numeration schemes and agency problems of the 
banking system. However, under the assumption that agents obtain sufficient incentives 
to invest in risky long-term assets it seems more likely that they will behave 
procyclically by increasing the leverage if asset markets are providing extraordinarily 
high returns and market risk appears to be relative low. Therefore it seems fairly 
reasonable for legal authorities and regulators to pay high attention to principal-agent 
problems and moral hazard within certain sectors of the banking industry, particularly 
during periods of invitingly high returns provided in the asset markets.
4  
  To carry out leverage adjustments during periods of increasing asset prices banks 
need to acquire additional short-term debt such as by looking for additional borrowings 
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from non-banks or collateralized or unsecured borrowings from other banks in the 
global interbank market. Such behavior is related to an increasing interconnectivity and 
funding liquidity risk of the banking system. Therefore, the procyclicality of banks` 
leverage is widely accepted as one important reason for the fragility of the banking 
system (Arian and Shin [2010] or Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin [2005]).  
  As seen during a number of financial crises over the past decades relative small 
shocks in asset markets can induce systemic crises for two reasons, that are well-
examined by different research groups.
5 First, a number of research papers are focused 
primarily on the role of asset prices during episodes of tumbling markets with respect to 
the aggregated and idiosyncratic liquidity of financial intermediaries. Cifuentes, 
Ferrucci and Shin (2005) underscore that asset sales by distressed financial institutions 
will lead to a further decline of asset prices if the demand of financial markets for 
illiquid assets is not perfectly elastic. This is consistent with Adrian and Shin (2010) 
who emphasize that the deleveraging of banks under tensioned market conditions by 
selling assets might induce a further decline of asset prices. Brunnermeier (2009) 
develops a theoretical model that explains the dynamics during the financial crisis in 
2007/2008. It is based on two major self-accelerating spirals of market liquidity risk and 
funding liquidity risk with their amplifying interdependencies. As Brunnermeier 
demonstrate, a decline of asset prices is one major component of these spirals that might 
have caused an unforeseen fragility of the banking system during several financial 
crises, such as the subprime crisis in 2007/2008.
6  
  Second, as argued, for example, by Brunnermeier (2009) or Gorton (2008), 
particularly high leveraged banks bear a tremendous funding liquidity risk. As Gorton 
(2008) highlights, for that reason bank runs are actually observable similar that during 
periods of the classic panics of the 19
th and early 20
th century. In general, bank runs are 
characterized by the fact that the holders of short-term liabilities refuse to fund banks 
for certain reasons. But in contrast to these classic panics that have been object of 
intensive research work ‘modern bank runs’ seem to involve the funding opportunities 
in the interbank market instead or in addition to withdrawals of deposits by non-bank 
clients. Previous research papers can generally be assigned to two different theories 
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explaining the origin of such panics. One strain of publications suggests that panics are 
caused by random events, such as unexpected withdrawals of deposits without any 
relation to changes in the real economy. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) do some 
influential work on bank runs as self-fulfilling prophecies with two different 
equilibriums. Either all consumers believe that other consumers will withdraw their 
deposit and redeem their claims as well and cause a panic by showing such a 
coordinated behavior, or everybody relies on the patience of all other consumers and 
will withdraw their deposits in the case of consumption needs only. From the industry’s 
point of view there is no need of costly liquidation of assets as long as all producers can 
meet their obligations. Allan, Babus and Carletti (2009) point out that the use of this 
theory is difficult since it remains quite unclear what kind of signals on these two 
equilibriums are observable by consumers. Moreover, these researchers highlight that 
the theory formulated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides not any predictive 
power since it assume that consumers’ beliefs are self-fulfilling and mostly coordinated 
by ‘sunspots’.   
  Another strand of research papers has revealed that panics could be interpreted as 
natural outgrowth of business cycles. As suggested by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), 
consumers will withdraw their deposits if they receive information on economic 
downturns and the possibility that banks might not meet their commitments. By means 
of this behavior consumers anticipate difficulties in the banking system and therefore 
reasons of panics are not random but a response on information on deteriorating 
economic conditions.
7 To summarize so far, it can be said that ‘modern bank runs’ 
might be related to a drying up of the interbank market. Upper and Worms (2004), for 
example, underscore that there is a pecking order such as that banks which are hit by a 
liquidity shock try to meet their liquidity needs by withdrawing their deposits from 
other banks before liquidating long-term assets under strained market conditions.
8 
  However, far too little attention has been paid to the interbank market in scientific 
literature over the past years. But due to experiences from the financial crisis in 
2007/2008 an increasing number of research papers have recently been published trying 
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to shed some light on freezes or drying up of the interbank market during financial 
crises, when banks stop trading with each other. 
  Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009) suggest a model of the interbank market that explains 
the excess volatility of prices in the interbank market, particularly observable if 
opportunities for banks are missing to hedge extraordinary aggregate and idiosyncratic 
liquidity demands under circumstances of financial crises. Furthermore, Allen, Carletti 
and Gale (2009) reviewed the role of central banks by fixing the short-term interest rate 
over episodes that are characterized by uncertainty about the liquidity demands of 
banks, and explain that interventions of central banks in the interbank market by 
conducting open market operations could improve the efficiency of the interbank 
market.   
  Within this context Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2010) consider two different types of 
liquidity shocks, which demand different central bank actions. First, central banks 
should reduce interbank interest rates during periods of distributional liquidity-shocks 
characterized by a great disparity in the liquidity held among banks. Second, central 
banks should intervene in financial markets by providing liquidity in order to manage 
the aggregated liquidity volume during periods of aggregate liquidity-shocks. Moreover, 
failures in cutting interest rates during financial crisis might erode the financial stability 
by increasing the risk of bank runs (Freixas, Martin and Skeie [2010]). Furthermore, 
Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2010) develop a model that covers the different states of 
liquidity needs and supports their hypothesis that central banks should lower interbank 
rates to increase the redistribution of liquidity within the banking system.
9 Finally, a 
failure to implement the optimal interest rate could lead to bank runs since the 
satisfaction of patient consumers is directly depending on interbank rates if banks have 
needs to borrow in the interbank market (Freixas, Martin and Skeie [2010]).  
  So far it is clear that global interconnections of banks have grown steadily as more 
and more banks participate in the interbank market. This development has subsequently 
increased risk of contagion that was currently observed during the financial crisis in 
2007/2008 to a great extent. Therefore, in recent years, there has been an increasing 
amount of literature on the underlying mechanism of such risk of contagion in financial 
                                                           
9 These arguments are quite contrary to Goodfriend and King (1997) who argue that the interbank market are efficient 
at any stage and can distribute liquidity optimally. In contrast, Diamond and Rajan (2009) follow the hypothesis that 
interbank rates should be low during episodes of financial crisis and high under regular circumstances. 6 
 
markets that generally follows two different directions: direct linkages and indirect 
linkages. Allan and Gale (2000) examine the interconnections of banks by exchanging 
interbank deposits as an insurance against liquidity shocks. By means of a theoretical 
model Allan and Gale (2000) demonstrate that the banking systems will be exposed a 
lower risk of contagion if the structure of interconnections is complete. This argument is 
consistent with Freixas, Parigi and Roche (2000) who demonstrate that banks are 
realizing such an insurance against liquidity shock by relying on committed credit lines 
to a great extent. However, systemic risks in the interbank market are particularly 
bearing the risk of coordination failures among depositors even if all banks are solvent. 
As pointed out by Freixas, Parigi and Roche (2000), there is some evidence that 
inefficient liquidation of solvent banks occurs as a result of contagion effects induced 
by one insolvent bank.
10 The question whether the banking system could find the 
optimal degree of interconnectivity is today among the most frequently discussed 
aspects within the context of interconnectivity of the banking system. Kahn and Santos 
(2010), for example, examine the optimal degree of insurance against liquidity shocks. 
They underscore that banks will not find the optimal degree of interconnectivity as long 
as there is a general shortage of liquidity within the banking system due to missing 
exogenously provision of liquidity.  
  Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2010) propose a model that can explain a sudden 
freeze in the market for short-term borrowing. Their model is based on the rollover risk 
implied with repurchase agreements or asset-backed commercial papers as instruments 
of collateralized borrowing. The authors maintain that if the roll-over risk is high, since 
the debt must be rolled over frequently, the debt capacity will be lower than the 
fundamental value of the underlying assets This theory could explain the tremendous 
haircuts of asset backed securities when used as collaterals in overnight repo borrowing 
during the subprime crisis. At the worst case the debt capacity converges to the 
minimum possible value of the asset that reflects the freeze of the interbank market for 
secured lending. Such a drying up of the interbank market particularly shows a deep 
impact on funding liquidity risk in the event of extreme maturity mismatches. For 
example, some of the collateralized debt obligations reported a haircut of 100% during 
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the subprime crisis, which means that these assets had not debt capacity at all and might 
subsequently induced a tremendous incline of funding liquidity risk within the banking 
system. Such phenomena were observable during the recent crisis since arrival of good 
news was slower than the rate at which debts were rolled over (Acharya, Gale and 
Yorulmazer [2010]).  
  Furthermore, there are a number of empiric research papers addressing on global 
contagion effects in the course of the financial crisis in 2007/2008. Abassi and Schnabel 
(2009) find some empirical evidence of spillover effects by examining the spreads 
between unsecured and secured money market rates. These interbank market rates 
increased sharply during the crisis. Moreover, the US, UK and Euro repos spreads 
became highly correlated within a short-time period. It is worth noting that the repo 
spread is a leading indicator for uncertainty within the banking system since it reflects 
the willingness to lend unsecured money in the interbank market for multiples of the 
rates of collateralized lending. In detail, the repo spread reached more than 100 basis 
points at maximum and became high volatile during the financial markets turmoil 
(Abassi and Schnabel [2009]). By showing that repo spreads were subsequently 
declining in response to liquidity provisions by central banks Abassi and Schnabel 
(2009) underscore that central bank operations were successfully. Moreover, the authors 
assume that liquidity and solvency were closely related during the crisis and that 
liquidity provisions by central banks efficiently avoided fire sales of assets by banks.
11 
  A second strand of research papers is based on the assumption of indirect linkages 
between banks` balance sheets that might strengthen effects of contagion under crisis 
circumstances. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005) explain that banks are strongly 
connected via their portfolio holdings. If all banks hold the same assets there will be a 
high risk of contagion if asset prices erode significantly. Therefore, an important role 
concerning undesirable spillover effects is played by mark-to-market rules, which might 
enhance transparency of balance sheets but introduce an additional source of contagion 
risk. Under particular circumstances more interconnected systems might be riskier than 
systems with a lower degree of connectivity (Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin [2005]).
12 
The importance of asset price changes within a spillover mechanism is consistent with 
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Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) who highlight that spillover effects are observable if firms 
hold similar assets that are used as collaterals under borrowing contracts and are object 
of significant price changes under strained market conditions. Beyond such indirect 
balance sheet contagion Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) maintain direct balance sheet 
spillover effects in the case of simultaneously borrowing and lending each other to a 
great extent. Finally, Jorion and Zhang (2009) find some evidence that contagion effects 
would be observable in the event of increasing counterparty risk.
13 
   Only little research work has been done so far for the German banking system. Upper 
and Worms (2004) discuss the linkage of credit risk and interbank lending as a potential 
source of contagion risk within the German banking system by estimating bilateral 
relationships on the basis of banks` balance sheets. The authors emphasizes that 
institutional guarantees may reduce contagion within the German banking systems but 
cannot avoid it at all. Their empiric work show some evidence that the failure of a 
single bank could lead to a significant breakdown of the German banking system since 
it could induce a 15% loss of total assets of the German banking system.    
  To summarize it can be said, that there is a large volume of published studies 
describing the relationship between leverage and liquidity and corresponding balance 
sheet operations of banks, the influence of asset prices under strained market conditions 
on aggregate or idiosyncratic liquidity, the role of the interbank market for distribution 
of liquidity and monetary policy as well as risk of contagion during financial markets 
crises and their underlying mechanisms. As pointed out above, there is only little 
research work done so far on the procyclical behavior of German banks that takes into 
account the leverage of balance sheets of different categories of banks. Apart from 
Upper and Worms (2004), who examine the danger of contagion across the German 
banking system, there are no empiric studies conducted so far on the fragility of the 
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German banking system due to procyclical behavior of banks and the role of different 
funding sources particularly over the course of the financial crisis in 2007/2008. 
  Therefore, the present study is centered primarily on determining whether the 
German banking system is to be characterized by procyclical behavior from 2000 to 
2011 and to what extent specific sectors of the German banking system showed 
significant balance sheet operations to increase their leverage within years of booming 
asset prices. Second, the current study is carried out to enlighten the consequences of 
such procyclically leveraging during the period of the subprime crisis in 2007/2008.
14 
Third, the available empirical data is used to find some evidence for distinguishable 
funding policies among specific sectors of the German banking system that result in an 
increased funding liquidity risk within these banking sectors.
15 Following the hypothesis 
that tremendous liquidity demands of banks in 2007 and 2008 were reasoned primarily 
by ‘modern bank runs’, which involved weakening funding opportunities in the 
interbank market instead or in addition to withdrawals by non-bank depositors, the 
present study is additionally focused on the role of banks’ non-bank and institutional 
funding preferences with respect to specific sectors of the German banking system.
16 
This is of major interest from the perspective of the industry because funding in the 
interbank market to a great extent is one of the most important channels of contagion 
within the global banking industry. Finally, the results of this study provide valuable 
advice for regulatory authorities and policy-makers on how to avoid such contagion risk 
by requiring banks to hold additional capital buffers and/or to ensure sufficient 
minimum distances to defaults.
17 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the origin and structure of the 
examined data and applied methodologies. Sector 3 subsequently reports the results and 
their assessment with respect to the constructed hypothesis. The paper finishes with a 
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Data and Methodologies 
The examined sample consists of data provided by Bundesbank’s Statistics Department. 
The present study includes several balance sheet items of German banks that were 
reported to Deutsche Bundesbank from 2000 to 2010 on a monthly basis. These data are 
aggregated on the level of different banking sectors (German major banks, regional 
banks, Landesbanken, saving banks, cooperatives, international bank holdings) and 
cover ‘total assets’, ‘capital’, ‘bank deposits with a maturity less than one year’, ‘non-
bank deposits with a maturity less than one year’, ‘bank deposits with a maturity less 
longer one year’, ‘non-bank deposits with a maturity longer than one year’, ‘bearer 
bonds’, ‘repurchase agreements’, ‘other liabilities’, and ‘earnings before tax’. Several 
statistic assessments are conducted in order to describe the structure and dynamics of 
the German banking system from 2000 to 2010 with a primary focus on changes before 
and during the financial crisis in 2007/2008. Moreover, a number of ordinary least 
square regressions are applied in order to find some evidence on the relationship 
between the leverage of banks’ balance-sheets and different independent variables that 
are listed in Table 1.
18 Within this context the leverage is calculated as the ratio of the 
sum of assets to the amount of capital on the liability side of the bank´s balance sheet. 
Finally, the study shed some light on the so-called ‘distance to default’ of different 
banking sectors that is a widely accepted measurement of the probability of a bank’s 
default. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Results 
The following results are obtained from descriptive statistics and regression models 
examined to shed some light on risk taking behavior of German banks over the period 
from 2000 to 2011 with a major focus on funding strategies and the leverage of balance 
sheets, which is defined as the ratio of total assets to total capital.  
  First, Table 2 provides an overview of the leverages of specific sectors of the 
German banking system over the period from 2000 to 2011 on a yearly basis. Column 1 
of Table 2 illustrates leverages of the entire German banking system. It is apparent from 
this data that the German banking system is generally characterized by fairly constant 
values during the observation period with peaks in 2000/2001 and 2005. The observed 
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maximum value in 2000 and decline of leverages from 2001 to 2003 can be assigned to 
the so-called ‘internet bubble’ and the subsequent crisis in financial markets as a 
consequence of a breakdown of the new economy. In detail, the German ‘major banks’ 
tend to increase their leverage from 2000 to 2005 providing only slightly lower values 
between 2005 and 2007 but a significant deduction of leverages in 2008 and 2009. 
‘Regional banks’, ‘saving banks’ and ‘cooperatives’ appear to have reduced their 
leverages over the entire observation period resulting in lowest values in 2008 compared 
to other banking sectors. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that ‘Landesbanken’ which are 
controlled by federal state authorities are among banks with the highest leverages. Table 
2 indicates that ‘Landesbanken’ increased their leverages from 2003 to 2008 to a great 
extent by related balance sheet operations and apparently operated their business on a 
level of risk taking quite similar those of ‘major banks’ or ‘international bank holdings’. 
This observation is of major interest since a number of ‘Landesbanken’ were among 
banks which have to be supported by the ‘Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
(Sonderfonds für Finanzmarktstabilisierung, or SoFFin)’ founded in 2008 by the 
German Government to stabilize the German banking industry.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 provides some evidence that increasing leverages are due to a tremendous 
upsizing of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets during the period from 2000 to 2008. 
It can generally be ascertained that, because of their high volume of total asset, German 
‘major banks’ and ‘Landesbanken’ play an important role within the German banking 
system. In detail, Table 3 reports the above-average increase of total assets in the case 
of German ‘major banks’ and ‘international bank holdings’. This increase of total assets 
is quite comparable to the trend observed in the event of ‘regional banks’. However, 
‘regional banks’ are less significant within the German banking system since they hold 
only a small part of the entire volume of assets of the German banking system. In the 
case of ‘international bank holdings’ the significant increase of total assets might reflect 
the increasing globalization of the international banking system that is frequently 
discussed as one reason of increasing risk of contagion over the last decade. In contrast, 
the exclusively locally operating ‘cooperatives’ and ‘saving banks’ are characterized by 
the lowest upsizing of the asset side of their balance sheets. Overall, it is apparent that 12 
 
special sectors of the German banking systems such as German ‘major banks’, 
‘Landesbanken’ or ‘international bank holdings’ are operating their balance sheets 
procyclically by upsizing the volume of total assets during periods of booming asset 
prices.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Within the context of upsizing the asset side of banks` balance sheets it is of great 
interest to assess different funding sources especially with regards to the significant role 
of the interbank market as a funding channel during the financial markets turbulences in 
2008. Therefore, Table 4 compares the percentage of short-term funding in the 
interbank market by the examined banking sectors from 2000 to 2011. With respect to 
the entire German banking system these funding ratios were fairly constant from 2000 
to 2009 at around 28% but characterized by a sharp decline in 2010 and 2011 as a result 
of increasing distrust in the interbank market. Apparently, German ‘major banks’, 
‘Landesbanken’ and ‘international banking holdings’ show the highest percentage of 
short-term funding in the interbank market, whereas locally operating ‘saving banks’, 
‘regional banks’ and ‘cooperatives’ show relatively low usage of this funding channel.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 presents a second source of banks` funding that is the short-term funding raised 
by acquiring savings or short-term deposits within the non-banking segment. Not 
surprisingly, locally operating ‘saving banks’, ‘regional banks’ and ‘cooperatives’ 
report higher percentages of short-term funding by non-banks than German ‘major 
banks’ and ‘international bank holdings’. It is noteworthy that ‘Landesbanken’ show 
extremely low percentages of short-term non-bank funding over the entire observation 
period but with a significant increase from 2008 to 2011. The growing importance of 
non-banks as a funding source in the case of ‘Landesbanken’ from 2008 to 2011 can be 
explained by the necessarily changing of funding policies of ‘Landesbanken’ as a result 
of increasing distrust of such banks in the interbank market. 
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
  To summarize so far, it can be ascertained that two dimensions of funding sources 
are worth to be examined in detail, that are the kind of funding source (non-bank 13 
 
funding or funding in the interbank market) and the terms of funding. Therefore, Table 
6 compares the total percentages of short-term non-bank funding and funding in the 
interbank market raised by specific banking sectors. In Table 6 the entire German 
banking system reports a general increase of short-term funding from 2000 to 2011. The 
observable significant increase of short-term funding particularly from 2008 to 2011 
might be explained by increasing distrust in the interbank market as well. This 
hypothesis is fairly consistent with the presumption of decreasing creditworthiness of 
banks by participants in financial markets who accept to borrow money on a short-term 
basis only during periods of shrinking confidence, particularly in the tensioned 
interbank market. Such a trend is of major interest for regulatory authorities since the 
higher the percentage of short-term funding of a bank the higher the risk by maturity 
mismatches. In detail, ‘Landesbanken’, ‘German major banks’ and ‘international bank 
holdings’ appear to rely on short-term funding to a growing extent whereas ‘regional 
banks’, ‘saving banks’ and ‘cooperatives’ show fairly constant high percentages of 
short-term funding from 2000 to 2008. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Next, a number of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are examined in order to 
clarify influences on leverages over the observation period in more detail. Table 7 
shows the result of a regression of certain macroeconomic and financial markets 
indicators as independent variables on the leverage as dependent variable.
19 In addition, 
a factorized variable ‘banking group’ is introduced to the regression model with 
‘international bank holdings’ as the basis. To compare obtained coefficients in an 
efficient way the corresponding standardized beta coefficients are additionally reported 
in Table 7. The displayed regression model is well fitted as reflected by an r-squared of 
0.6060. Among the macroeconomic and financial markets indicators ‘repos’ and 
‘current yield’ of bonds with a maturity of 10 years enter the regression with positive 
and statistically significant coefficients. This provides some evidence that repurchase 
agreements and high yields quoted in capital markets force banks to increase their 
leverages by conducting applicable balance sheet operations. This observation is fairly 
interesting particularly as repurchase agreements that allow secured money lending in 
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the interbank market get a growing attention by the industry over the last years. 
However, beyond that the different banking sectors obtained negative and statistically 
significant coefficients. Among banks that show the highest standard beta coefficients 
are German ‘major banks’, ‘regional banks’ and ‘cooperatives’. Therefore, it seems 
likely that there is a strong relationship between the leverage of banks and their 
assignment to the specific banking sectors whereas ‘Landesbanken’ enter the regression 
with the lowest standard beta coefficient. This is consistent with the observation that 
‘Landesbanken’ apparently operated their business at a high level of leverages as 
suggested by the results displayed in Table 2. At this stage, one may keep in mind that 
‘international bank holdings’ are defined as the base of the considered factorized 
variable because they showed the highest leverages during the period from 2000 to 2011 
(for further details see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In order to test the sample on collinearities the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are 
displayed in Table 8. The reported results confirm the assumption that the independent 
variables are characterized by only weak collinearities, if any. Some other robustness 
checks on the regression models are done as well whose results are consistent with the 
listed Variance Inflation Factors. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Next, regression models on each single banking sector are examined to enlighten the 
relationships between leverages and certain macroeconomic and financial markets 
indicators. The results reported in Table 9 generally confirm that obtained standard beta 
coefficients are depending on the examined banking sectors to a certain extent. In detail, 
the volume of repurchase agreements (‘Repo’) is reported to be positively and 
statistically significantly related to the leverage in the case of German ‘major banks’ 
whereas ‘international banking holdings’ and ‘Landesbanken’ obtained negative and 
statistically significant coefficients. German ‘major banks’ seem to refund high 
leverages by increasing their volume of repurchase agreements whereas ‘international 
banking holdings’ and ‘Landesbanken’ tend to prefer this kind of money market deals at 
low levels of leverages. This may be related to interest rates in the interbank market 
(‘Libor3m’) as suggested by the positive and statistically significant standard beta 15 
 
coefficients in the case of German ‘major banks’ and ‘Landesbanken’. Particularly 
‘Landesbanken’ appear to upsize their asset side of balance sheets in dependency of the 
3 month Libor rate, since they obtained the highest standard beta coefficients of all 
considered banking sectors. In contrast, it is likely that ‘cooperatives’ and ‘saving 
banks’ reduce their leverage with increasing 3-month Libor rates since they obtained 
negative and statistically significant coefficients. In contrast, the relationship between 
the current yields of bonds with a ten-year maturity (‘CY10y’) seems to be an inverse 
one for the majority of banking sectors. As is to be expected, leverages of banks are 
depending on short-term as well as long-term interest rates to a great extent. This 
evidence may be of major interest from the perspective of central banks since the results 
suggest that some categories of banks are operating procyclically in dependence of 
interest rate policies conducted by central banks.   
  The considered financial markets indicators (‘MSCI’ and ‘GBI’) show if any only a 
weak relationship with the dependent variable. The German gross domestic product 
(‘BPI’) enters the regression with positive and statistically significant coefficients in the 
case of German ‘major banks’ and ‘Landesbanken’, whereas ‘international bank 
holdings’, ‘cooperatives’ and ‘regional banks’ obtained negative and statistically 
significant coefficients. This may be of major interest from the macroeconomic 
perspective since German ‘major banks’ and ‘Landesbanken’ significantly contributes 
to the German gross domestic product in term of total assets. Moreover, the reported 
dependences between leverages and return on assets (‘ROA’) are characterized by high 
and statistically significant standard beta coefficients for German ‘major banks’ and 
‘Landesbanken’. This relationship might reflect the relative high percentage of risky 
assets within their portfolios since the ‘ROA’ is negatively related with the leverages of 
such banks. Finally, accordingly to the variable reflecting the amounts of bond bearing 
funding instruments (‘logBB’) Table 9 provide fairly confusing results since German 
‘major banks’ and ‘regional banks” obtained negative and statistically significant 
coefficients whereas ‘international bank holdings’ and ‘saving banks’ enter the 
regression with negative and statistically significant coefficients. Therefore any 
interpretation of this variable seems quite difficult.  
  In summarizing so far, it can be underscored that the leverage of a bank is apparently 
related to its assignment to a certain banking sector. Furthermore, it can be pointed out 16 
 
that each banking sector is operating its leverage fairly differently depending on various 
macroeconomic and financial markets indicators. This fact might be due to the varying 
business models of the special banking sectors as well as the different ownership 
structures within the German banking system. 
  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on principal agent problems 
observable within the banking system that try to explain the relationship between 
ownership structures and risk behavior in terms of the so-called ‘distance to default’. In 
Table 11 this risk measure is reported taking into account the various banking sectors 
whereas the calculation of distances to default is based on profit and losses listed in 
Table 10. It is apparent from these tables that due to the higher volatility of profits and 
losses the distances of default calculated for German ‘major banks’, ‘Landesbanken’ 
and ‘international bank holdings’ were fairly low compared with other banking sectors. 
In contrast, ‘saving banks’ and ‘cooperatives’ operated their business at significantly 
higher distances to default over the entire observation period. A similar situation was 
observable in the case of ‘regional banks’ from 1999 to 2007 but with a significant 
drawdown of distances to default from 2008 to 2010. In addition, Table 11 displays 
tremendous losses of German ‘major banks’ and ‘Landesbanken’ in 2008 and 2009 that 
significantly contributed to the severity of the crisis within the German banking system 
during the course of the global subprime mortgage crisis. Accordingly, it can be 
assumed that a number of banks within these sectors were de facto bankrupt in 2008 and 
2009. Although the data coverage on this topic is fairly poor Table 11 provides some 
evidence that the leverage of banks as well as the distance to default should get a high 
attention under such crisis circumstances. Since low distances to default were 
observable over the entire observation period the apparent difficulties of German banks 
in 2008 and 2009 were not so surprisingly. Quite the opposite, the results of this study 
emphasizes that higher leveraging and declining distances to default might be useful 
early warning signs for regulatory authorities and policy-makers.  
 
[Insert Table 10 and 11 here] 
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Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is primarily centered on the risk taking behavior of different 
sectors of the German banking system. As pointed out by Adrian and Shin (2010), risk 
taking behavior is among others reflected by procyclical balance sheet operations that 
increase the ratio of total assets to capital.
20 Moreover, this leverage plays an important 
role concerning the bank`s distance to default that is widely accepted as an appropriate 
measurement of the bank`s probability of default.
21  
  First, the results of this study show that the different sectors of the German banking 
system operated their business more or less procyclically: German ‘major banks’ or 
‘Landesbanken’ increased their leverage during episodes of booming asset markets 
whereas ‘cooperatives’ or ‘saving banks’ appeared to reduce their leverage during the 
same period. Second, the study provides some empirical evidence that banks increasing 
their leverages during such periods of extraordinary high returns provided in the 
financial markets preferred funding their assets by short-term lending in the interbank 
market whereas other sectors such as ‘saving banks’ or ‘cooperatives’ relied on non-
bank funding to a higher degree. Such a funding behavior became fairly important 
during tensions of the financial markets in 2007/2008 since an increasing distrust in the 
interbank market caused severe liquidity shortages of banks that had refunded their 
assets in the interbank market to a great extent.
22 
  Third, the study clarified that banks, preferring high leverages, can apparently be 
characterized by a high volatility of return on assets over the observation period. This 
observation provides an indirect measurement of risk taking behavior.
23 Both high 
leveraging by targeted balance sheet operations and high dispersion of return on assets 
resulted in low distances to default that reflects the vulnerability of such banks during 
crises periods as seen, for example, over the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007/2008. As 
a consequence of such observable risk behavior from the perspective of regulatory 
authorities it seems fairly reasonable to introduce a countercyclical capital buffer.
24 This 
means that bank will be obliged to lower their leverage during periods of excessive 
                                                           
20 See for example Adrian and Shin (2010) or Brunnermeier (2009). 
21 This commonly accepted so-called Z-Score was proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986). 
22 Abassi and Schnabel (2009) for example examined contagion effects in the interbank market during the subprime 
mortgage crisis in 2007/2008. 
23 See for example Barry et al. (2008). 
24 A countercyclical capital buffer is part of the ‘International regulatory framework for banks (Basel III)’; see Bank 
for International Settlements (2011). 18 
 
credit growth that may lead to high losses when asset prices are significantly turning 
down. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that regulatory authorities are well-
advised to control the funding sources of banks sufficiently that could potentially faced 
a drying out during crises episodes. As described by a number of publications tensions 
in the interbank market could actually be seen as a kind of ‘modern bank run’.
25 
Furthermore, it seems to make good economic sense to distinguish between different 
banking sectors concerning the application of regulatory requirements since the results 
of this study provide some empirical evidence that the considered banking sectors are 
operating their balance sheets in a fairly distinguishable way. Such selective regulatory 
requirements may be of major interest for the German banking industry since regulatory 
affairs are fairly expensive to handle and could decrease the competitiveness 
significantly in the case of certain banking sectors.  
      Finally,  the  examined  regression  models provide some empirical evidence that 
requirements on countercyclical capital buffers should be considered by regulatory 
authorities in the context of macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates or the gross 
domestic product since some banking sectors appear to response procyclically 
depending on interest rates and a positive economic climate by targeted balance sheet 
operations that may lead to lower distances to default in the event of increasing 
volatility of return on assets. Additional future research may clarify the dependency 
between such risk taking behavior and other macroeconomic indicators in more detail.
26   
  
                                                           
25 Refunding behavior is taken into account by the so-called ‘Net Stable Ratio’ within the Basel III framework; see 
Bank for International Settlements (2011). 
26 Referring to the Basel III framework ‘The countercyclical capital buffer aims to ensure that banking sector capital 
requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in which banks operate.’ see Bank for International 




Table 1: Dependent and independent variables 




ratio of total assets to capital            
     	      
    	       
 
banking sector  sectors of German banking system as defined 





German major banks 
international bank holdings 
return on assets 
(ROA)  ratio of returns to total assets       
      
     	      
 
capital asset ratio 
(CAR)  ratio of capital to total assets       
       




ratio of  sum of capital asset ratio and return 
on assets to standard deviation of return on 
assets 
    
         
      
 
repos  interest rate of three month repurchase 
agreements  extracted from Bloomberg
27 
libor3m  three month libor rate  extracted from Bloomberg 
MSCI  MSCI World   extracted from Bloomberg 
GBI  Global Bond Index  extracted from Bloomberg 
BIP  German gross domestic product  provided by Deutsche Bundesbank 
current Yield 10y  current yield of 10 year benchmark bonds  extracted from Bloomberg 
log(bearer bonds)  logarithm to base 10 of  sum of  bearer bonds  provided by Deutsche Bundesbank 
Table 2: Leverages of German banking sectors 
This table shows leverages (defined as total assets/capital) of different German banking sectors from 2000 
to 2011 as of January each year (GB=German major banks, RB=regional banks, LB=Landesbanken, 
SPK=saving banks, GEN=cooperatives, AB=international bank holdings). 
 
year total  GB  RB  LB  SPK GEN  AB 
2000  24.10 15.60 18.34 26.36 23.94 20.18 22.47 
2001  23.71 15.59 19.53 25.41 23.12 19.38 31.42 
2002  22.91 15.39 18.84 23.52 22.70 19.64 28.49 
2003  21.77 15.80 18.61 20.44 21.88 19.34 28.77 
2004  22.28 18.81 18.12 21.52 21.31 18.58 29.30 
2005  23.35 24.56 16.51 22.80 20.72 18.22 31.18 
2006  21.65 24.22 15.45 22.60 20.10 17.81 25.12 
2007  21.39 21.96 16.01 23.23 19.36 17.03 25.89 
2008  21.61 22.44 16.81 24.38 18.82 16.57 23.85 
2009  21.16 17.90 21.52 22.94 18.68 17.23 20.07 
2010  20.37 18.80 18.60 19.61 18.46 17.31 18.83 
2011  21.39 24.05 17.60 22.17 17.86 16.72 20.34 
                                                           




Table 3: Volumes of total Assets of German banking sectors 
This table reports volumes of total assets of different German banking sectors in billions of Euro from 
2000 to 2011 as of January each year (GB=German major banks, RB=regional banks, LB=Landesbanken, 
SPK=saving banks, GEN=cooperatives, AB=international bank holdings). 
 
year  total   chg %  GB   chg %  RB   chg %  LB   chg % 
2000 5767212  849,872 523,144 1,138,990 
2001 6126775  6.23%  993,401 16.89% 607,252 16.08%  1,207,151  5.98%
2002 6336457  3.42%  1,012,261 1.90% 633,227 4.28%  1,271,535  5.33%
2003 6420338  1.32%  1,058,460 4.56% 662,252 4.58%  1,312,725  3.24%
2004 6487954  0.42%  1,057,574 0.49% 676,702 1.82%  1,361,423  1.66%
2005 6718976  3.95%  1,251,463 18.41% 576,110 -14.99%  1,280,280  -4.84%
2006 6981158  3.90%  1,265,120 1.09% 603,185 4.70%  1,368,351  6.88%
2007 7226573  3.52%  1,313,293 3.81% 623,436 3.36%  1,454,463  6.29%
2008 7628615  5.56%  1,438,948 9.57% 686,427 10.10%  1,563,074  7.47%
2009 7970371  4.48%  1,482,739 3.04% 786,113 14.52%  1,578,219  0.97%
2010 7525485  -5.58%  1,308,947 -11.72% 724,028 -7.90%  1,449,849  -8.13%
2011 8232993  9.40%  2,007,247 53.35% 740,621 2.29%  1,450,591  0.05%
2000-2008  38.20% 74.47% 50.27%  38.56%
year  SPK   chg %  GEN   chg %  AB   chg % 
2000 914,212  527,803 236,237
2001 932,721  2.02%  525,338 -0.47% 279,985 18.52% 
2002 969,035  3.89%  543,791 3.51% 299,524 6.98% 
2003 976,721  0.79%  554,933 2.05% 382,200 27.60% 
2004 982,036  0.50%  561,602 1.14% 377,617 -2.64% 
2005 988,201  0.40%  572,222 2.07% 432,370 13.21% 
2006 1,000,474  1.24%  586,583 2.51% 732,858 69.50% 
2007 1,009,455  0.90%  603,563 2.89% 802,269 9.47% 
2008 1,023,036  1.35%  623,108 3.24% 858,363 6.99% 
2009 1,058,231  3.44%  666,509 6.97% 891,500 3.86% 
2010 1,064,855  0.63%  688,922 3.36% 812,448 -8.87% 
2011 1,072,737  0.74%  700,216 1.64% 900,096 10.79% 
2000-2008  15.75% 26.28% 277.38% 
 
Table 4: Short-term funding in the interbank market by German banking sectors in % of total 
assets 
This table shows the percentages of short-term funding in the interbank market of different German 
banking sectors from 2000 to 2011 as of January each year (GB=German major banks, RB=regional 
banks, LB=Landesbanken, SPK=saving banks, GEN=cooperatives, AB=international bank holdings). 
 
year total  GB  RB  LB  SPK  GEN  AB 
2000  28.42% 36.41% 32.58% 36.33% 22.14% 14.23% 49.39% 
2001  28.63% 38.71% 30.76% 35.18% 23.77% 14.86% 48.55% 
2002  28.37% 37.61% 29.41% 36.29% 22.97% 14.13% 45.22% 
2003  28.62% 40.60% 28.65% 35.07% 22.42% 13.70% 35.85% 
2004  28.05% 40.64% 29.70% 33.28% 22.50% 13.17% 36.80% 
2005  28.07% 37.70% 31.20% 32.94% 21.89% 12.86% 36.14% 
2006  28.25% 37.35% 29.24% 33.21% 21.95% 13.13% 32.33% 
2007  28.21% 36.17% 27.22% 35.62% 20.80% 12.99% 33.33% 
2008  28.55% 36.63% 22.92% 37.73% 19.45% 12.98% 33.51% 
2009  28.48% 34.84% 24.58% 32.75% 19.53% 15.37% 36.83% 
2010  27.00% 34.52% 20.69% 30.25% 18.66% 15.38% 33.21% 
2011  23.80% 22.88% 19.98% 27.53% 17.40% 14.10% 30.95% 21 
 
Table 5: Short-term non-bank funding by German banking sectors in % of total assets 
This table reports the short-term non-bank funding in % of total assets of German banking sectors from 
2000 to 2011 as of January each year (GB=German major banks, RB=regional banks, LB=Landesbanken, 
SPK=saving banks, GEN=cooperatives, AB=international bank holdings). 
 
year total  GB  RB  LB  SPK  GEN AB 
2000  21.63% 22.68%  36.38% 7.37% 49.40% 56.72%  16.78% 
2001  20.45% 21.85%  31.65% 7.66% 46.44% 53.93%  15.19% 
2002  21.65% 23.58%  34.67% 7.74% 48.65% 56.35%  18.24% 
2003  22.26% 23.48%  37.79% 7.15% 49.66% 57.16%  19.63% 
2004  23.18% 25.80%  38.51% 7.63% 50.58% 58.40%  24.21% 
2005  23.77% 30.94%  37.88% 8.16% 50.85% 58.61%  25.36% 
2006  24.04% 32.00%  39.08% 8.81% 51.27% 59.19%  26.24% 
2007  23.89% 31.37%  40.82% 9.49% 50.29% 57.49%  26.94% 
2008  24.41% 31.73%  43.52% 10.51% 49.71% 57.00%  28.91% 
2009  25.24% 30.72%  41.82% 14.05% 50.93% 57.52%  31.35% 
2010  26.72% 30.72%  46.65% 14.32% 54.59% 58.35%  33.96% 




Table 6: Short-term funding by German banks in % of total assets 
This table shows the yearly short-term funding by German banks in % of total assets from 2000 to 2011 
as of January each year, where GB=German major banks, RB=regional banks, LB=Landesbanken, 
SPK=saving banks, GEN=cooperatives, AB=international bank holdings. 
 
year total  GB RB LB  SPK  GEN  AB 
2000  25.68% 30.84% 43.55% 12.32% 50.10% 57.12% 29.84% 
2001  24.66% 32.40% 37.87% 11.49% 46.94% 54.49% 28.76% 
2002  25.53% 32.37% 39.42% 12.25% 49.16% 56.66% 28.99% 
2003  26.11% 32.61% 41.85% 11.73% 50.26% 57.59% 25.49% 
2004  27.50% 38.09% 42.62% 12.26% 51.19% 58.76% 30.40% 
2005  28.01% 40.52% 42.91% 13.41% 51.36% 58.77% 31.37% 
2006  27.80% 40.21% 43.35% 13.15% 51.85% 59.62% 32.02% 
2007  28.05% 39.76% 45.64% 14.96% 50.90% 57.99% 33.61% 
2008  28.89% 41.22% 48.41% 15.25% 51.15% 57.67% 36.21% 
2009  30.36% 41.89% 49.04% 17.88% 52.97% 58.13% 42.78% 
2010  31.99% 45.03% 51.75% 18.77% 56.23% 58.84% 44.89% 
2011  31.07% 31.35% 53.16% 18.84% 59.35% 62.18% 43.24% 
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Table 7: Ordinary least square (OLS) regression  
This table shows the results of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions over the period from 2001 to 
2009. The leverages are defined as the dependent variable. The independent variables are completely 
described in Table 1. The sample covers 804 monthly observations. Significance Levels are marked with 
*** (P>t) <=0.01, ** (P>t) <=0.05 and ** (P>t) <=0.1. The regression provides an r-squared of 0.6060, 
an adjusted r-squared of 0.5990, and a root MSE of 2.398. 
 
Coef. Std.  Err.  t  P>t  Beta 
repos  0.0000    0.0000       6.7100  0.0000***       0.2842  
libor3m  -0.1477    0.1202   -   1.2300  0.2200   - 0.0531  
MSCI  -0.7739    2.1873   -   0.3500  0.7240     - 0.0099  
GBI  -3.6014    4.8559   -   0.7400  0.4590     - 0.0197  
BIP  3.2599    3.9719       0.8200  0.4120        0.0201  
current yield 10y  1.4340    0.1992       7.2000  0.0000***       0.2872  
return on assets (ROA)  -0.3106    0.4312   -   0.7200  0.4720     - 0.0225  
log(bearer bonds)  0.4190    0.6502       0.6400  0.5190        0.0456  
cooperatives  -7.2406    0.3800   -19.0600  0.0000***    - 0.7165  
Landesbanken  -3.7012    0.5965   -   6.2000  0.0000***    - 0.3663  
regional banks  -7.4467    0.3053   -24.3900   0.0000***    - 0.7369  
saving banks  -4.8925    0.3369   -14.5200   0.0000***    - 0.4842  
German major banks  -8.7823    0.4934   -17.8000  0.0000***    - 0.8691  
cons  18.1100    3.3311       5.4400  0.0000***     .  
 
 
Table 8: Ordinary least square regressions: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
This table reports the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to test the dependent variables on collinearities. 
The Variance Inflation Factors have an intuitive interpretation. Variance Inflation Factors less than 5 
indicates that the independent variable shows only weak multicollinearity, if any (for further information 
on Variance Inflation Factors see Belsley et al. 1980). 
 
Variable VIF  1/VIF 
libor3m 3.58  0.279624
current yield 10y  2.71  0.369185
return on assets (ROA)  1.82  0.548364
log(bearer bonds)  1.57  0.637126
MSCI 1.54  0.65062
repos 1.50  0.666698
GBI 1.40  0.716656
BIP 1.16  0.860307
Mean VIF  1.91    
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Table 9: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of different banking sectors 
This table shows the results of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions over the period from 2001 to 
2009. The leverages are defined as the dependent variable. The independent variables are completely 
described in Table 1. The sample covers 804 monthly observations. Significance levels are marked with 
*** (P>t) <=0.01, ** (P>t) <=0.05 and ** (P>t) <=0.1.  
 
GB AB GEN  LB  RB  SPK 
repos  0.8502***  -0.9380***  - 0.0740  - 0.4090***  -0.0456   
libor3m  0.5015***  0.0033  - 0.2164*     1.2904***  0.1054  -0.5910*** 
MSCI  0.0120  -0.0417  - 0.0332     0.0576  -0.2221**  0.0037 
GBI  - 0.0394  -0.0535  0.0019     0.0535  0.0578  -0.0033 
BIP  0.1654**  -0.1287**  - 0.2110***    0.1927***   -0.4422***  0.0728 
current yield 10y  - 0.2699**  -0.0796  0.9744  - 0.1647  0.4445***  0.9798*** 
return on assets (ROA)  - 0.4358***  0.1066  0.0008***  - 0.8312***   -0.1714  0.1381** 
log(bearer bonds)  - 0.2007***  0.1754***  - 0.4764  - 0.0632  -0.3496***  0.2706*** 
 
 
Table 10: Profit and Losses after tax of banking sectors from 1996 to 2010 
This table reports the return on assets (ROA) of different German banking sectors from 1999 to 2010. 
(GB=German major bank, RB=regional bank, LB=Landesbank, SPK=saving bank, GEN=cooperatives, 
AB=International bank holding). 
 
year total  GB  RB    LB    SPK  GEN  AB 
1999  0.20 0.20 0.45 0.13 0.24 0.21 0.15
2000  0.19 0.24 0.30 0.10 0.25 0.19 0.57
2001  0.20 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.38 0.35 0.22
2002  0.15  -0.12 0.41 0.08 0.35 0.46 0.28
2003 -0.05  -0.44  0.11  -0.17 0.18 0.26 0.10
2004 0.07  -0.10  0.11  -0.02 0.23 0.27 0.10
2005  0.31 0.56 0.31 0.17 0.27 0.47 0.21
2006  0.29 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.47 0.23
2007  0.18 0.57 0.36 0.03 0.21 0.30 1.17
2008 -0.32  -0.76  0.10  -0.39 0.11 0.23 -0.29
2009  -0.08 -0.31 -0.06 -0.34 0.23 0.28 0.10
2010 0.15  0.08  0.07  -0.05 0.38 0.45 0.23
 
Table 11: Distances to default of German banking sectors from 1996 to 2010 
This table shows the distances to default (DD) of different German banking sectors from 2001 to 2010. 
(GB=German major bank, RB=regional bank, LB=Landesbank, SPK=saving bank, GEN=cooperatives, 
AB=International bank holding). 
 
year  total GB  RB    LB    SPK  GEN  AB 
1999  1.42 0.67 3.17 0.88 3.94 2.57 0.57
2000  1.35 0.77 2.22 0.71 4.04 2.39 1.75
2001  1.43 0.62 1.47 0.80 5.93 3.96 0.75
2002  1.15  -0.14 2.92 0.67 5.54 5.06 0.92
2003  -0.03 -0.98  1.04 -0.64 3.17 3.10 0.39
2004  0.66  -0.15 1.07 0.12 3.89 3.21 0.39
2005  2.09 1.52 2.36 1.12 4.47 5.20 0.72
2006  1.97 0.95 2.09 1.84 4.08 5.23 0.77
2007  1.33 1.55 2.64 0.37 3.68 3.56 3.49
2008  -1.60 -1.78  0.92 -1.81 2.29 2.85 -0.70
2009  -0.18 -0.65 -0.04 -1.51 3.98 3.34 0.45
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